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Abstract. Dynamic virtual organisations (VOs) can arise in situations in which 
it is critical that they continue to operate, even in sub-optimal environments. 
Models of information flow in dynamic VOs are therefore needed in order to 
permit the rigorous verification of resilience properties before commitments are 
made to implementation. This paper proposes a refinement-based modelling 
approach for the design and analysis of VO policy resilience. The approach is 
demonstrated by using the refinement-based formalism Event-B to model a VO 
structure, commonly referred to as the Bronze/Silver/Gold structure that 
frequently arises in multi-agency response to emergencies. Machine-assisted 
proof is used to compare the validity of alternative information flow policies in 
Bronze/Silver/Gold when a fault is induced in the VO structure.   
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1.    Introduction  
Advances in networking technology have made it possible to establish virtual 
organisations (VOs) of collaborating entities that together enable new capabilities and 
services that cannot be achieved by the constituent systems alone [1]. In our work, we 
are particularly concerned with dynamic VOs whose membership, structure and goals 
may change during the life cycle [2] in response to changing circumstances, and 
particularly faults or malicious attacks. Dynamic VOs bring significant societal and 
business opportunities by offering, for example, more agile multi-agency emergency 
response, or coordinated management of resources such as energy. 
In order to take advantage of the opportunities presented by dynamic VOs, it is 
necessary to address the challenges that stem from their complexity and 
heterogeneity. These include managing the complexity of the behaviours and 
interactions between participants, managing access to resources, and communicating 
effectively between diverse stakeholders. Furthermore, as VOs become established 
and reliance is placed on them, it becomes vital to have methods and tools that 
support the validation of properties such as safety or security, and the resilience of the 
VO in maintaining these properties in the face of failures or malicious attack.  
To gain confidence in a VO’s resilience, it is paramount to have a precise model of 
its architecture, the resources, functionality and behaviour of the participant systems, 
infrastructure, and environment [3]. Models support “trade-off” analysis of alternative 
designs at early development stages, and the precise determination of the contract 
(rights and responsibilities) that exists between each participant and the VO. Further, 
the models themselves can assist communication between the diverse stakeholders.   
The goal of our research is to provide models and analysis techniques that can be 
used to support the comparative analysis of alternative VO models, architectures and 
policies. We use formal modelling notations in order to take advantage of the analytic 
techniques underpinning these notations, including proof and model-checking. Rather 
than attempt to prove the properties of a complex VO in a single attempt, there is a 
strong case for managing the verification as a series of refinement steps starting with 
a highly abstract description embodying the desired properties of the VO. From this 
abstract model, detail can be added step by step, with each incremental refinement 
being verified.  
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the viability of a refinement-based 
approach to the modelling and verification of information flow within VOs and to the 
analysis of alternative VO policy models with respect to resilience. We describe the 
relevant state of the art in formal modelling of VOs (Section 2) and introduce our 
proof-of-concept study based on real major incident response procedures in the 
London area (Section 3). We present a refinement-based model of this VO in Section 
4, focussing on response to serious communications failure. Finally we draw 
conclusions from the modelling approach and discuss further work (Section 5).  
2.  Formal Modelling of Virtual Organisations 
Although there is a perception that formal engineering methods are “very hard to 
apply” [3], improvements in tools and automation are leading to their increased 
successful deployment on an industrial scale [4]. Their major benefit is in reducing 
risk in the development of complex systems such as VOs by allowing early detection 
and elimination of defects and bottlenecks through the analysis of formal, abstract 
models using static analysis techniques such as proof and model-checking.  
Several characteristics of dynamic VOs – operational and managerial 
independence of participants, heterogeneity and dynamic change – make the formal 
modelling of VOs a challenge. A truly comprehensive framework would require 
abstractions to describe functionality, concurrency, distribution and mobility but few, 
if any, formal methods currently handle all these features successfully.  
Although the formal modelling of VOs is in its infancy, useful models of specific 
aspects of VOs are being constructed. Recent examples include: the use of the model-
oriented formalism Z combined with the CSP process calculus to describe identity 
management problems [5]; a formal operational model for VO creation [6]; and 
‘infrastructure-agnostic’ formal models of business VOs and Virtual Breeding 
Environments [7]. The Vienna Development Method (VDM) has been used to model 
dimensions of VOs with respect to information flow, including structure, 
membership, responsibility and provenance [8], consistent with (sub-)dimensions 
identified by [3]. However, the VDM models are only analysed by means of 
simulation [9], since proof support for VDM is not yet well supported by tools. The 
Event-B formalism manages the complexity of proof by structuring models as chains 
of machines linked by refinement relations, and is well supported by proof tools. 
Further, Event-B has been demonstrated as a viable basis for modelling conflicts of 
interest within VOs [10], as well as QoS parameter negotiation [11].  
Most work on formal modelling of VOs has concentrated on the description of 
normal behaviour, and not faults, accidental or malicious. Error detection and 
recovery can complicate VOs considerably, increasing the risk of design errors, and 
we expect that formal models could assist the developer of VO policies to assess the 
impact of faults and the suitability of resilience mechanisms.  
The study in this paper aims to investigate the feasibility of using a refinement-
based formal method to analyse the resilience of VO structures in advance of 
deployment. We use Event-B because of its tool support for proof, and its ability to 
represent the information flow characteristics of a VO. We model a VO that provides 
opportunities to explore abnormal behaviour because it exists in a volatile 
environment that may disrupt its operation. We describe the case study in Section 3 
and its refinement-based model, including disruption and recovery, in Section 4.  
3. Bronze-Silver-Gold: The London Major Incident Procedures 
Our case study is based on the London Emergency Service Liaison Panel (LESLP) 
manual [12], which summarises procedures and responsibilities of the emergency 
services (e.g., police, fire, or ambulance) in response to a major incident. Activities 
governed by the manual include rescue and transport of casualties, coordination of 
resources, and handling release of information to the media.  Once a major incident is 
declared, a VO (which we term a coalition) is formed by the services.  
The LESLP manual covers many aspects of the coalition life cycle, but we focus 
on the structural and information flow aspects. These are vital to the successful 
functioning of the coalition, particularly in managing the release of accurate 
information, for example regarding the number and location of casualties.   
A typical response coalition contains several levels of command: referred to as 
bronze, silver, and gold (B/S/G). Each service has members working at each level, so 
we may refer to “Bronze Police” or “Silver Medic”. Silver and Gold commands work 
in inter-agency coordinating groups. Bronze implements tactics defined by silver. 
Silver formulates tactics to be adopted by each service following strategy determined 
by Gold. Gold command, geographically distant, contains the service commanders.  
Agents at a common level may communicate freely, but between adjacent levels 
communication is only between agents of the same service.  Information flow out of 
the coalition is subject to several alternative policies.  Certain information may be 
independently released to the media by an individual service, but casualty figures 
must be cleared by Gold Police.  In our case study, we model an alternative 
information clearing policy in which all members of the Gold co-ordinating group 
must clear information for release.   
4. Refinement-based Event-B Modelling of Information Flow 
An Event-B model [13] is a series of machines, each (apart from the first) linked to its 
predecessor by a refinement relation.  A machine contains variables modelling state 
information, invariants (labelled inv) which constrain the variables, and events which 
change the state. An event has guards (labelled grd) which must be true for the event 
to occur, and actions (labelled act) which change the values of state variables. Each 
machine may have associated carrier sets held in a context visible to the machine.  
For each step in the refinement chain, a refinement relation links the variables in 
the abstract model with those in the concrete model, and is defined by gluing 
invariants. Adding a machine or a refinement step generates proof obligations to 
ensure the consistency of the machine and the validity of the refinement.  For 
example, the invariant preservation obligation ensures that invariants hold after an 
event occurs. An event in the concrete model refines an event in the abstract model if 
the concrete guards imply the abstract guards, and the variable states reached after the 
occurrence of the concrete and abstract events are linked by the gluing invariants. 
Proof obligations are generated and in some cases proved automatically by the 
Rodin tools [14]. Those that are not proved automatically may be discharged by the 
developer with the help of the theorem proving interface.  Proof obligations may be 
impossible to prove, in which case the model is inconsistent and should be corrected. 
Models which are proven consistent are said to be machine-checked.  
Section 4.1 outlines a normative model of the B/S/G coalition1, including a policy 
governing the flow of information into, through, and out of the coalition. An 
additional step refines this policy by distributing responsibility for executing it across 
several coalition agents.  Both policies are machine-checked. The model is then 
extended with an event modelling the loss of a coalition level, and the policies are re-
examined with respect to this enhanced model in Section 4.2.   
4.1 Normative Coalition Model and Information Clearing Policies 
The model has four levels of abstraction.  The most abstract machine treats the 
coalition as a single entity. The second machine introduces the B/S/G architecture, 
and the third machine realises this architecture in terms of individual agents. These 
model a centralised information clearing policy, in which all Gold members 
simultaneously clear information for release, for example at a joint meeting. 
Information is learned, cleared for release, and released in separate, atomic events. In 
the fourth machine, this policy is refined into a set of actions distributed across 
members of Gold to give a distributed information clearing policy in which 
information is ready for release when it has been cleared by all members.   
Let INFO be the set of all information. At the initial level, sets of the known, 
cleared for release and released information are given as global variables.  Learning, 
clearing and releasing of information are represented by events.   Here, the Event-B 
model is shown in abbreviated form. inv2 in Fig. 1 is a key security property of the 
information flow policy: only cleared information may be released. 
                                                          
1 The models used in this paper are available at http://deploy-eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/ 
inv1: known, cleared, released ⊆ INFO 
inv2: released cleared  ⊆
 
LearnNewInfo(i)  ≡
  grd: i ∈ INFO 
  act: known := known {i} ∪
ClearInfo(i)≡  
  grd: i ∈known 
  act: cleared :=cleared {i} ∪
 
ReleaseInfo(i)≡  
  grd: i ∈cleared 
  act: released := released ∪ {i}
Fig. 1. Learning, clearing and releasing information at the coalition level. 
The B/S/G structure is given by the intermediate machine, part of which is shown 
in Fig. 2. Bronze, Silver and Gold are defined as members of a carrier set ELEMENT. 
The coalition variable records the levels currently in the coalition, and coal_known 
records the information known at each level (inv2). Separate events describe the 
creation of a coalition at Bronze level and addition of Silver and Gold in ascending 
order, as envisaged in [12].  Communication takes place only between adjacent levels. 
For this study, we consider a policy whereby only Gold can clear information for 
release (ClearInfoGold).  The information must be known by Gold (grd1) and not 
previously cleared (grd2). In ReleaseInfoGold, grd3 ensures that information may be 
released only after it is cleared.  
 
inv1: coalition {Bronze, Silver, Gold} ⊆
ClearInfoGold(i)  ≡
  grd1: i∈coal_known[{Gold}] 
  grd2: i∉cleared 
  act1: cleared :=cleared {i} ∪
 
inv2: coal_known ∈coalition  INFO ↔
ReleaseInfoGold(i)≡  
  grd1: i∈coal_known[{Gold}] 
  grd2: Gold ∈coalition 
  grd3: i ∈cleared  
  act1: released := released ∪ {i} 
Fig. 2. The architectural-level machine. 
The next level introduces agents. An agent’s service (Police, Fire or Ambulance) and 
level are given by the functions service and element respectively. The relation info 
gives the information known by individual agents (inv1 in Fig. 3). inv2 and inv3 are 
the gluing invariants between info and coal_known.  They ensure that information 
known by an agent in info must be known at the level of the agent in coal_known and 
vice versa. ClearInfoGoldAllElements is the atomic clearing event in this machine. 
inv1: info ∈AGENT  INFO ↔
inv2: ∀ i,ag •ag ∈dom(service)∧ i∈ info[{ag}]⇒element(ag) i a ∈  coal_known 
inv3: ∀ lvl,i • lvl∈dom(coal_known)∧ lvl i a ∈  coal_known ⇒  
                                  (∃ ag•ag∈dom(element) ∧ element(ag)=lvl∧ ag i ∈ info)   a
 
ClearInfoGoldAllElements(i)  ≡
  grd1: element~[{Gold}] {}   ≠
  grd2: ∀a • (a ∈dom(element)∧ element(a)=Gold) ⇒ i ∈  info[{a}] 
  grd3: i∉cleared  
  act1: cleared = cleared ∪ {i} 
Fig. 3. The agent-level machine. 
The fourth machine refines the centralised clearing policy into a distributed one (Fig. 
4). Any services represented at Gold individually clear information for release (event 
ClearInfoService), and when all services represented at Gold have cleared 
information, it can be cleared by the coalition (event ClearInfoGoldDistrib).  We also 
include the consistency invariant (inv1) between the information cleared by the 
coalition as a whole (variable cleared) and the information cleared by each service 
(variable serviceCleared). This records the intuition that all information cleared by 
the coalition must have been cleared by all members of Gold. This requires a change 
to the event which adds an agent to the coalition:  if an agent joins Gold it must agree 
with the information clearing decisions already made by the coalition. 
inv1: ∀ag •  ag ∈dom(service) ⇒  
             (element(ag)=Gold  ⇒  cleared serviceCleared[{service(ag)}]) ⊆
 
    ClearInfoService(ag,i)≡  
  grd1: ag ∈dom(element) 
       grd2: element(ag) ∈Gold 
       grd3: i ∉serviceCleared[{service(ag)}] 
  act1: serviceCleared :=serviceCleared {service(ag) a i} ∪
 
ClearInfoGoldDistrib(i)  ≡
  grd1: element~[{Gold}] {}   ≠
  grd2: ∀a • (a ∈dom(element)∧ element(a)=Gold) ⇒ i ∈  info[{a}] 
  grd3: ∀a • (a ∈dom(element)∧ element(a)=Gold) ⇒ i ∈serviceCleared[{service(a)}] 
  grd4: i∉cleared  
  act1: cleared = cleared ∪ {i} 
Fig. 4. The distributed clearing policy. 
4.2 Analysis of Policy Resilience 
A significant risk to the coalition is the loss of a command layer, for example through 
communications failure.  We consider the case where Gold is lost and must be replaced by a 
new set of agents, and the effect this has on the centralised and distributed information clearing 
policies. Since it is possible that the level lost was the sole holder of certain information, 
possible information loss must be included at each abstraction level in the model. In the first 
machine, this is modelled by the event LoseInfo (Fig. 5). We do not give the event in the 
intermediate machine. The event which models the loss of an entire level of command in the 
third machine is RemoveLevelTotal.   
LoseInfo(inf)≡  
  grd: inf ⊆ INFO 
  act: known := known \ inf 
 
 
 
RemoveLevelTotal(lvl) ≡  
  grd1: lvl ∈ran(element) 
  act1: coalition := coalition \ {lvl} 
  act2: service := element~[{lvl}]     service 
  act3: element := element~[{lvl}]     element 
  act4: info := element~[{lvl}]    info 
Fig. 5. Removing a level of command. 
All obligations resulting from the addition of these events can be proved, although 
three extra invariants are required in the third machine.  However, the distributed 
clearing policy causes a problem:  it is now impossible to prove inv1 in Fig. 4.  The 
offending event is CreateGold. If Gold has been lost and is being recreated, we 
cannot show that the agent re-forming Gold belongs to a service that is prepared to 
clear all information that has been cleared by the previous instantiation of Gold.     
Investigation of the failed proof, offending event and consistency invariant 
suggests several ways forward.  The policy could be extended to require that an agent 
re-forming Gold agrees with all previous clearing decisions. This would entail 
altering the event CreateGold. Alternatively, the consistency requirement between the 
two policies could require that any released information was once cleared by all 
services that made up Gold. This would entail maintaining a record of the 
membership of Gold at all times, and the information cleared by each Gold grouping. 
A further alternative is to treat the creation of Gold as different from its recreation, 
and the set of information cleared by the coalition could be reset to empty.  The 
choice between these alternatives would rest with the policy developer and 
stakeholders.  The advantage of the formal model is that the precise cause of the 
inconsistency is quickly identified and can be communicated to stakeholders, along 
with the avenues for re-design.   
5. Discussion 
This paper has shown how a formal model of a virtual organisation can provide a 
good basis for an analysis of the information flow policy of the organisation.  When 
potential defects came to light, several options for alternative designs were readily 
identified.  
Many topics are open for further research.  Extensions to the model are possible, 
such as considering the response to multiple intersecting crises.  The information 
model could be refined to include, for example, policies for handling classified 
information. Modelling the roles and the associated responsibilities of the agents 
would also lead to richer possibilities for policy analysis, including policies other than 
information flow.  Many emergency response coalitions are much more ad-hoc than 
B/S/G, and looking at ways to model these less structured ways of dealing with 
complex crises is also of interest,  including ways to integrate formal and semi-formal 
approaches [3,15].  
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